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Central Bank Balance Sheet Analysis 
 
By Professors Philipp Bagus and David Howden1 
 
Abstract: Balance sheet analysis is standard practice for assessing private sector businesses. 
No such analysis has been applied to central banks previously. We provide the theoretical 
foundation and rationale for such analysis. This foundation is rooted in the quality theory of 
money which places special emphasis on subjective factors as a complement to the more 
conventional quantitative factors that determine money’s purchasing power. The balance 
sheet of a central bank reveals the quality of the assets backing a currency and serves as an 
indicator of future monetary policy. Several accounting ratios proxy the quality of money in 
terms of assets held by the central bank, alluding to potential shifts in its purchasing power. 
These ratios can also be used to estimate the scope of future monetary policies that are 
feasible by the central bank. 
 
Zusammenfassung: Bilanzanalyse ist eine Standardpraxis im privaten Sektor. Jedoch gibt es 
noch keine systematische Bilanzanalyse von Zentralbanken. Wir entwickeln eine theoretische 
Basis und Begründung für eine derartige Analyse. Die Grundlage der Zentralbankanalyse 
wurzelt in der Qualitätstheorie des Geldes, welche die subjektiven Faktoren betont und die 
konventionellen, eher quantitativen Faktoren ergänzt, die die Kaufkraft des Geldes 
bestimmen. Eine Zentralbankbilanzanalyse enthüllt die Qualität der Vermögenswerte, die eine 
Währung decken und ist ein Indikator für die Entwicklung künftiger Geldpolitik. 
Verschiedene Bilanzkennzahlen fungieren als ein Proxy der Geldqualität unter 
Berücksichtigung der Vermögenswerte der Zentralbank, die eine künftige Veränderung der 
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Kaufkraft des Geldes andeuten. Diese Kennzahlen können auch dazu genutzt werden, um die 
künftigen Optionen der Geldpolitik auszuloten. 
 
JEL Classifications: E31, E52, E58, E59, M40 
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1 Introduction 
The balance sheet of any business summarizes the past results of its operations, and also gives 
clues as to what ventures will be desirable, or even possible, in the future. As such, an 
analysis of the balance sheet provides insights into the present and expected future financial 
health of the firm. Furthermore, with readily available data on publically listed corporations, 
balance sheet analysis is easily achieved at minimal cost. Finally, due to the transparent and 
open nature of balance sheet items, analysts can quickly reach consensus on the fortunes (or 
misfortunes) of a firm and thus minimize disagreements as to the company’s general health.  
 
While analyzing balance sheet strengths and weaknesses is an essential component in 
management studies, forming a core part of degrees in accounting, corporate finance, and 
business administration, there have been very few attempts to standardize the practice in the 
area of banking. This omission leaves Werner and Padberg wondering why it is “that until the 
present no specific analysis of banks' balance sheets has been conceived, although a separate 
treatment of banks´ balance sheets is necessary.”2 
 
Bank balance sheet analysis is still in its infancy but receiving new interest due to the recent 
financial crisis. Despite this attention, no comprehensive application to central banks has been 
attempted, and the implications of such analysis are still widely neglected. This article 
rectifies this omission. 
 
A central bank’s balance sheet has a different importance for the state of an economy than 
that of a specific firm. Firm specific balance sheet analysis primarily indicates economic 
value; central bank balance sheet analysis reflects changes to the assets which back a 
currency. A far broader economic meaning is provided through the latter. The central bank’s 
assets enable it to pursue its monetary policy goals effectively through various instruments 
including open market operations, the discount rate and reserve requirements. The analysis of 
a central bank´s balance sheet has become especially fruitful as central bankers have started to 
use compositional shifts of their assets directly for money policy.3 Zero interest rate policies 
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 test the limits of conventional monetary policies. In response, changes in the composition and 
size of central banks’ balance sheets have been pursued.4 The dramatic compositional changes 
and expansion undertaken by the Federal Reserve from late 2008 2014 under the guise of 
quantitative easing are examples of these new monetary policies. Increased attention directed 
at central bank asset holdings has become a larger issue than in the past when central bank 
assets were more homogenous, i.e., primarily comprised of short-term government bonds. 
 
This paper will provide the basis of a homogenous set of tools to analyze a central bank’s 
balance sheet. Such analysis will only be useful if a link can be made between the quality and 
quantity of such assets and the value of the central bank’s liabilities (mostly comprised of the 
monetary base). In order to make such a link, theoretical tools and instruments of both 
economics and business management must be combined. Over the course of the 20th century, 
mainstream monetary economics has emphasized the role of the quantity equation to 
determine the value of the monetary unit. While such an analysis is not obviously incorrect, 
the attention the equation affords to past quantities, both of money and nominal transactions, 
obscures the real problem at hand regarding the value of and demand for the monetary unit. 
While the value of the monetary unit is predicated on its usefulness in performing 
transactions, its demand will be based upon the expected future prices that it will be used to 
purchase (this is one key insight of Mises’ “regression theorem” of money).5 Since future 
prices are determined by the interaction between the demand for money and its future supply, 
balance sheet analysis can give insight into what the investor can reasonable expect the 
central bank to be able to target for the quantity of money.  
 
Section 2 of this paper will overview how the purchasing power of money is established, 
incorporating both present and known factors as well as future expectations. Section 3 looks 
at the specific functions of money and how they are affected by future expectations 
concerning not just the quantity of money (as per standard analysis) but more importantly, the 
quality of money. Section 4 develops a standard set of tools to analyze the central bank’s 
balance sheet, and as such sheds light on future changes to the quality of money as well as 
what type of quantity changes are feasible. In section 5 we provide some additional caveats to 
consider when making comparisons of central banks according to the previously developed 
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 analysis. Section 6 concludes with some brief and sundry comments on the importance of 
holding central banks to the same standard as private businesses in affairs concerning its 
balance sheet. Our elaboration of central bank balance sheet analysis lays the foundation for a 
new method of monetary policy analysis. 
 
2 The Quantity versus the Quality Theory of Money 
Modern monetary economics emphasizes the use of the quantity theory of exchange in 
determining the purchasing power of money.6 The simple quantity theory of money can be 
expressed by the Fisherian equation of exchange, MV = PY, where M is the quantity of 
money, V is its velocity (i.e., rate of circulation), Y is real output and P is the price index of 
this output. With V and Y assumed constant in the long-run, the quantity of money directly 
determines money's value (as the inverse of the general price index). Qualitative factors play 
no explicit role in the quantity theory of money.7 In contrast to the supply focused quantity 
theory, the quality theory emphasizes the importance of qualitative factors for money´s 
demand and contrasts sharply with the simple quantity theory of money represented most 
famously by Irving Fisher (1911) and updated by Milton Friedman (1956). 
 
The quality of money is defined as the capacity of a good to fulfill money´s three roles: to 
serve as a medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. Quality is a subjective 
concept in the sense that users individually regard a good as capable of fulfilling money’s 
functions to differing degrees. The subjective valuation of money can change without changes 
in the money supply. As the purchasing power of money may change due only to a shift in the 
demand for money, the subjective valuation of money can change even with the expectation 
of a constant money supply. For example, the backing of currency (i.e., central bank reserves) 
can change and, thus, affect the subjective valuation of the representative currency through, 
e.g., changing expectations as to the future rate of inflation or the ability of the central bank to 
act as a lender of last resort to the private banking system.  
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As the quality of money improves and users value it more highly in relation to other goods, its 
purchasing power increases.8 One result of increases in quality is, ceteris paribus, price 
deflation. When the quality of a good improves such that it moves higher up an individual’s 
value scale, its price increases as a response to demand-side pressures. As the price (or value) 
of money is the inverse of the money prices of goods and services, price deflation will be 
promoted by improving quality of money. Unlike changes to the quantity of money, which are 
generally continual, changes in the quality of money can be very abrupt, leading to strong and 
sharp purchasing power changes. 
 
A long history of qualitative and demand-side analysis predates the modern attention to 
supply-side factors determining money’s value. Early authors such as Juan de Mariana 
(1609) and Sir William Petty (1662) illustrate this long tradition of the quality theory of 
money.9 Adam Smith (1776) explains the origin of money by pointing to the importance of 
certain qualities such as a commodity’s divisibility and durability. Similar discussions of the 
qualities of a “good” medium of exchange are found in the classic works of Jean Baptiste Say 
(1803), John Stuart Mill (1848), and William Nassau Senior (1850). Carl Menger (1871) 
explained the origin of money as a market process whereby commodities with certain 
marketable qualities prevail at becoming generally accepted exchange media. By the time 
William Stanley Jevons (1875) wrote his treatise Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, the 
characteristics or qualities of “good” money were generally known (and are still today 
summarily detailed in most introductory monetary economics texts). In spite of this early 
focus on the quality of money, attention on this aspect has all but disappeared. Despite most 
introductory texts stressing money’s emergence in terms of qualitative factors (i.e., 
fungibility, divisibility, durability, universal want, etc), the quantity of money is regarded as 
the primary factor determining its value. 
 
3 The functions and the quality of money 
3.1 Determinants of the quality of money as a unit of account and medium of exchange 
                                                                                 
8
 See Bagus (2009; 2015). 
9
 For example, they regarded coin clipping not only as an increase in the quantity of money in circulation, but 
also as a reduction in its quality and as an unfair tax. Coin clipping was an early form of inflation. Corners, or 
edges, of coins were literally “clipped” off to lower a coin’s unit weight. The invention of the serrated edge on 
coins exposed this act, and reduced its prevalence. 
 The quality of money differs depending on which of its three functions it is fulfilling. The unit 
of account function is relatively stable under conditions of low and stable inflation. It changes 
abruptly only in hyperinflations, as users begin to calculate in alternative media. During the 
German hyperinflation in the early 1920s, for example, Germans began to calculate in gold 
marks or foreign exchange. The recent Zimbabwean hyperinflation (which culminated in 
November 2008 with a monthly inflation rate of 80 billion percent) led entrepreneurs to price 
goods in units other than their own devalued currency, preferring to unofficially set prices in a 
more stable standard, i.e., U.S. dollars.10 
 
The classical economists analyzed money´s medium of exchange function extensively. The 
following conditions better satisfy this function: lower costs of transportation and storage, 
easier divisibility, greater recognizability, stronger durability, and superior homogeneity of 
the money units. Economists of the past focused on finding natural commodities to satisfy 
these conditions. Today´s modern economy is based on fiat money which fulfills these 
demands well (almost perfectly well).  
 
3.2 Determinants of the quality of money as a store of value 
The store of value function must be treated more extensively. Users store some of their wealth 
in the form of the most marketable good to use later in purchasing goods and services.11 The 
better a good conserves its value, the better it will serve the larger function, ceteris paribus, as 
money. Despite their broad demand, perishable goods such as milk or eggs function poorly as 
stores of value, explaining why they fail to prevail as money. 
 
The quality of money in its store of value function can essentially change in five ways.  
 
First, an important influence on money´s quality is the evolution of its quantity. The modern 
fiat monetary system based on paper currencies can experience important quantitative 
changes. It can deteriorate through inflation to such an extent that a money is eventually 
demonetized. This is achieved by altering the degree to which fiat money´s store of value 
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 function is maintained. The store of value function is mainly, but not exclusively, influenced 
by the quantity of money in existence today or, more importantly, the quantity expected to 
exist in the future.12 Expectations concerning the evolution of the quantity of money are not 
the only factor influencing money´s store of value function.  
 
Second, changes in redemption ratio may influence the quality of money while the 
expectation concerning the future quantity of money remains constant. Consider two 
situations: a dollar bill can presently be redeemed for 1/20 of an ounce of gold and at a future 
date this redemption ratio is changed to 1/35 of an ounce of gold, or 1/20 of an ounce of 
silver, or redemption is suspended altogether. The quantity of money circulating is not 
changed by this act although its role as a store of value is affected negatively.13  
 
Redemption changes may influence the valuation of the currency unit in relation to other 
goods even if expectations concerning the future quantity of money remain constant. Users 
may not value the currency unit as highly in relation to other goods as they would have 
without the change in the backing of the currency. Alternatively, the course of a war can 
influence the value of a currency as the end of a government can mean the end of the 
currency, i.e. the redemption ratio may be expected to fall to zero. Henry Hazlitt provides an 
example from World War II concerning events that influenced the quality, but not the 
quantity, of money: “One of the most striking illustrations of the importance of the quality of the 
currency occurred in the Philippines late in World War II. The forces under General Douglas 
MacArthur had affected a landing at Leyte in the last week of October 1944. From then on, they 
achieved an almost uninterrupted series of successes. Wild spending broke out in the capital of 
Manila. In November and December 1944, prices in Manila rose to dizzy heights. Why? There 
was no increase in the money stock. But the inhabitants knew that as soon as the American forces 
were completely successful their Japanese-issued pesos would be worthless. So they hastened to 
get rid of them for whatever real goods they could get.”14 
 
Third, the quality of money in its store of value function is also influenced by the general 
condition of the banking system. An illiquid banking system increases the risk of a bail-out 
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 that ultimately increases the quantity of money. Deterioration in the conditions of the banking 
system can be detected on the central bank´s balance sheet, e.g., by sharp increases in 
overnight lending or loan rates. Any deterioration decreases the quality of money and 
generates expectation-based inflationary pressures. 
 
Fourth, the organization of the monetary authority is also of the utmost importance for the 
quality of money. A central bank receiving directives directly from the government increases 
the danger of monetizing government debts. Thus, when a formerly “independent” central 
bank loses its independence, the quality of money is changed instantaneously.15 A 
government increasingly trying to influence the decisions of an “independent” central bank 
may deteriorate the quality of money without commensurate changes in the quantity of money 
circulating. 
  
Changes in a central bank´s constitution (i.e., its philosophy or doctrine) may lead to changes 
in the quality of money. Assume, for example, that a central bank changes its stated target 
growth rate of the money supply from 5 to 10 percent. The announcement instantaneously 
changes the quality of money through increased inflationary expectations. If a central bank 
abandons a rule-based monetary policy and switches to targeting asset prices, this change will 
also immediately influence the quality of money as a store of value. Additional central bank 
objectives such as full employment or financing educational expenditures influence the 
quality of money. If the constitutional objective is originally price stability and it is changed 
to include ancillary aims (e.g., full employment, increasing asset prices, maintenance of a 
currency union, etc.) this will affect the quality of money: the aim of price stability might be 
less forcefully pursued compared to another goal. Uncertainty ensues with the business 
community unsure what the dominant aim of the central bank will be. 
 
The staff of the central bank is also relevant for the quality of money. Central bank chairmen 
influence monetary policy primarily through building consensus, a role which directly 
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 impacts the credibility of a proposed monetary policy.16 The substitution of a conservative 
chairperson for a new, dovish one known to have an inclination toward expansionary 
monetary policy will reduce the quality of money based upon this inflationary expectation the 
day when this substitution is announced, irrespective of any changes in the money supply.17  
 
3.3 The quality of the central bank´s balance sheet as a determinant of the quality of 
money 
 
The fifth reason for changes in the quality of money in regard of its function as a store of 
value is a change to the reserves and assets of the central bank.18 As central bank is the most 
relevant determinant of the quality of money for the purpose of this article, we treat it 
separately. In contrast to the soft factors mentioned above, the assets of the central bank are 
objective factors that can be assessed directly by analyzing its balance sheet. The monetary 
base, for example, can be observed directly as the central bank’s non-equity liabilities.  
 
The quality of money can be analyzed indirectly by the assets that back the monetary base. 
The average backing asset of the monetary base is essential for the quality of money and is 
recorded on the balance sheet. In a fractional-reserve banking system the average backing of 
the currency in circulation can decrease or increase as the monetary base changes. The 
average quality of the backing assets increases when newly bought assets are of a higher 
quality than the average of the existing assets. The average quality of the backing assets 
decreases when newly bought assets are of a lower quality than the average existing assets, a 
process known as “qualitative easing.” 19 
 
The significance of the quantity of money for the quality of money should not be 
overestimated. Quantitative changes to the monetary base adversely affect the quality of 
money as its backing reserves may be diluted. However, the quality of the assets of the central 
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 bank can change even with a constant money supply as the central bank substitutes its high 
quality assets by purchasing lower quality assets.  
 
Central bank assets are important as they serve as collateral for its liabilities and “back” the 
currency. Even though in most fiat money regimes there is no legal obligation to redeem the 
currency against the central bank’s assets, the assets represent the capacity of the central bank 
to defend the price of the currency domestically as well as internationally in foreign-exchange 
markets. The central bank can, for example, use its reserves to support its currency through 
foreign-exchange interventions.20 Central bank use of reserves is a de facto redemption – 
reserve assets are used to purchase currency and users redeem their currency units against the 
reserves.  
 
Additionally, the central bank may use its assets to support the banking system. Buying 
troubled assets from the banking system against good assets held by the central bank may 
restore confidence in the banking system’s solvency. Only if the central bank owns a 
sufficient amount of high quality assets can it credibly swap them with the banking system. 
The quality of the central bank´s assets is important for its capacity to credibly support a 
struggling banking system. Under some plausible though unusual scenarios, central bank 
assets can be used in the case of monetary reform. (Such reforms were widespread amongst 
ex-Soviet bloc countries after 1992-93 and with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1991.) 
The higher the quality of the assets, the better will be the backing of the new money (and 
resultant confidence in it). 
  
The importance of the central bank's assets is revealed in extremis during a collapse of the 
currency. A break-down of the monetary system reduces the value of its currency. 
Meanwhile, the assets of the central bank may retain value and can be given to the creditors 
and currency holders, or used in exchange for imports. Currency holders prefer, ceteris 
paribus, a central bank that holds liquid assets (i.e., foreign exchange or gold) as its main 
reserves to a central bank that holds illiquid assets (i.e., subprime mortgages) in the case of a 
monetary breakdown. Insolvency will occur only in rare cases since the domestic government 
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 Central bank cooperation may also improve the quality of a currency. When inter-central bank swaps are 
secured speculative attacks on a currency may be deterred.  
 or foreign creditors such as the IMF can recapitalize the central bank.21 Government 
recapitalization of the central bank is generally financed through debt ultimately funded by 
monetary expansion. Deterioration of a central bank´s assets increases the danger of a 
recapitalization by a monetary expansion. This in turn decreases the quality of money as a 
store of value as inflationary pressures ensue.  
 
Expectations play an important role for the quality of money. We previously looked at how 
institutional changes, staffing alterations and future policy directions all influence the quality 
of money through expectations concerning their changes. Expectations can also change 
concerning the quality of the currency’s backing. Assume that a central bank sells gold 
reserves to buy mortgages of dubious quality. The quality of money is changed without a 
concurrent change in its quantity. Currency users can expect that the central bank’s liabilities, 
i.e., mainly currency and member bank reserves, will be backed by assets of a decreased 
average quality. The recent Icelandic crisis illustrates this point.22 The króna fell sharply even 
though the money supply did not increase correspondingly. It became apparent that the 
banking system´s liabilities were backed by low quality assets. Lacking a sufficient amount of 
quality assets, the central bank could not compensate the losses incurred by the banking 
system. The central bank was unable to be recapitalized by the Treasury as the 
creditworthiness of the Icelandic government was already negatively shaken. The market 
realized that the Icelandic króna was backed mainly by credits to an insolvent banking system 
and that the central bank and the banking system could not be saved by the domestic 
government.23 The króna collapsed and the inflation rate increased without a correspondent 
change in the quantity of money. 
 
The assets of the central bank have very important implications concerning the quality of its 
representative money. The historical evolution of the central bank’s assets is summarized on 
its balance sheet. By combining the logic of balance sheet analysis used primarily for private 
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 Central banks functioning as lenders of last resort in economies heavily indebted in foreign currency face strict 
disadvantages. See Buiter/Sibert (2008). As foreign currency liabilities take an increasing share of the banking 
system, the central bank becomes increasingly impotent at combating currency and banking crises through 
expansionary monetary policy. 
 businesses with the quality theory of money we may generalize a method of balance sheet 
analysis specifically for central banks. 24 
 
4 Derivation of balance sheet ratios for central banks 
A central bank's financial ratios are important for two reasons.25 They indicate the ability to 
defend the value of a currency, e.g., on the foreign-exchange market, by representing de facto 
exchange possibilities via the currency´s backing assets. They also portend the danger of 
central bank insolvency which would presumably be prevented by a recapitalization by the 
government. Any rescue will likely deteriorate the quality of money through quantitative 
expansion. 
 
The quality of money is made measurable and objective, to a certain degree, by these ratios. 
Unfortunately monetary policymakers are motivated by certain interests that may not be 
conducive to the full disclosure or transparency of all balance sheet items.26 They may restrain 
the publication of pertinent or timely information in order to influence behavior from these 
communications.27 Any central bank balance sheet analysis should attempt to uncover these 
discretionary policies and guarantee a policy-neutral disclosure of the actual situation. The 
situation of different central banks could be compared by standardized accounting practices 
for the purposes of a peer group comparative analysis.  
 
One caveat in international comparisons of accounting statements is the lack of homogeneous 
data. International balance sheet comparisons are fraught with peril owing to diverse 
accounting traditions and standards which vary from country to country.28 Banks and 
insurance companies generally operate more opaquely than other firms leading to much 
disagreement and uncertainty concerning their asset and liability values. This opaqueness 
remains even in a shared regulatory environment. Broader acceptance of the International 
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 See McLeay (1991); Sherman/Todd (1997); Serrano/Cinca et al (2002). 
 Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow for a better comparison of balance sheets 
internationally and across different industries.29 With this caveat in mind, we now define 
strength, liquidity, and equity ratios necessary to analyze the financial stability of a central 
bank.  
 
International strength ratios indicate a central bank´s potential to defend the external value of 
a currency (i.e., the foreign-exchange rate). We define the “defense potential ratio” as the 
ratio of the foreign-exchange reserves (excluding gold, if applicable) to the monetary base. It 
portrays the percentage of monetary liabilities that are backed with foreign reserves available 
to be used to defend the currency on the foreign-exchange market. Selling foreign reserves on 
the open market and purchasing domestic currency can support the value of the currency in 
times of crisis or speculative attacks. 
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Second, the “external strength ratio” is defined as the ratio of the foreign-exchange reserves of 
a central bank to total world foreign-exchange reserves, i.e., the total of foreign-exchange 
reserves held by all central banks of the world. 
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The higher the share of total world foreign-exchange reserves that a central bank owns the 
greater will be the potential to defend the currency internationally. There results a higher 
degree of external strength as the central bank controls a higher portion of available reserves 
vis-à-vis other monetary authorities. It may also indicate the previous strength of a currency 
area to generate exports (and thus accumulate foreign currency as the central bank sells 
domestic currency to facilitate the cross-border transactions), benefiting the quality of money 
through increased trade-based demand. If a currency area is competitive it is easier to generate 
foreign-exchange reserves that can be used to defend the currency. 
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 The external strength ratio also indicates the danger of a flight from a currency as a reserve 
currency. It is possible that a central bank´s share of total world foreign-exchange reserves 
falls because foreign central banks accumulate its currency. A central bank which unilaterally 
increases its currency supply which is then bought by foreign central banks will experience a 
decline in its external strength ratio. (This outcome was prevalent throughout the Bretton 
Woods era, and the culmination of this loss of external strength was the end of the gold 
exchange standard in 1971.) This arises as world currency reserves increase by the 
expansionary monetary policy while its own foreign-exchange holdings do not. The danger of 
future sales of this expanded currency supply rises, with a commensurate reduction in its 
quality. Thus, the large reserves of, e.g., the central banks of China and Japan create a 
potential danger for the U.S. Dollar. They may, for example, sell their dollar holdings and 
depreciate the American currency. A rising share of world foreign reserves indicates that a 
central bank can defend its currency more effectively against such speculative actions.  
 
Alternatively, the external strength ratio is also relevant for a country whose currency is not a 
world reserve currency. The higher the dollar reserves of the central bank of Russia in relation 
to the world dollar reserves, the higher its capacity to defend its own currency from 
speculative attacks. 
 
The “external impact” ratio is defined as the foreign reserves of a country divided by the 
overall daily trading volume in foreign-exchange markets of those reserves. 
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The dollar reserves of a central bank divided by the total daily trading volume in foreign-
exchange markets is one important external impact factor. It indicates the capacity to 
influence the exchange rate as per general market, and especially trading volume, 
considerations. Traditionally the external impact factor for U.S. dollars has been rather low 
due to its widespread international use and demand; the external impact factor for gold and 
other less frequently demanded currencies tends to be higher. Low external impact factor 
values imply that large volumes of a currency may be traded with little effect on the 
prevailing exchange rate, thus bringing stability to a currency against speculative attacks. 
 
  
The higher the share of liquid and high quality assets in the central bank’s reserves the higher 
the quality of money will be. Gold and high quality currencies are generally considered very 
liquid. These prices may be volatile, but they do not face credit risk. The share of government 
bonds is important when assets are viewed in terms of credit risk. High quality government 
bonds (i.e., U.S. Treasury bills) enjoy a very large and liquid market enabling them to be sold 
en masse without losses through increased bid-ask spreads. Credit risk is also low.  
 
Consequently, we can define another group of ratios: liquidity ratios I, II, and III. An asset is 
considered more liquid the lower the costs incurred during a high volume sale. During a 
crisis, liquid assets can be used to support a faltering currency. The higher the liquidity ratio 
the lower the portion of illiquid assets held in reserve. Illiquid assets are problematic as they 
cannot be sold in high quantities during normal market conditions (without suffering a 
widening bid-ask spread), and may find no buyer under panic conditions. The higher the share 
of illiquid assets the lower will be the liquidity ratio. The quality of money will likewise be 
reduced. 
 
Gold has traditionally held the coveted position as a highly liquid asset and this is especially 
apparent during economic or banking crises. Important qualities had helped it to retain the 
position as the dominant world currency until the early 20th century. Gold can be sold in high 
quantities without adverse bid-ask spreads as it is always and everywhere demanded (even 
experiencing heightened demand during times of crisis). In contrast to other non-money 
financial assets, gold has no credit risk as it does not represent a debt.  
 
Liquidity ratio I reports the percentage of assets that are readily saleable and which do not 
represent a debt. Typically this is limited to the share of gold in the central bank assets.30    
 
+
,-
.
	/		
	0	% =
".
'	/	1
 
 
                                                                                 
30
 Gold is the most common central bank commodity holding. This need not always be the case. It is foreseeable 
that a central bank could stockpile other commodity holdings, such as silver, platinum, or other valuable metals. 
Due to gold’s near universal acceptance in central bank reserves, we focus exclusively on this factor in liquidity 
ratio I. 
 Liquidity ratio II compares the sum of gold and foreign-exchange reserves in relation to total 
assets. Foreign-exchange reserves are normally very liquid as they are traded daily in large 
volumes. Their value is less assured than gold since credit risk implies that their value can 
theoretically be reduced to zero in extreme cases. Downward pressure exerted by central 
banks on the gold price is limited by their gold reserves, while central banks can devalue their 
own currency to virtually zero through inflationary policies.  
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Liquidity ratio III includes high quality government bonds with a low default risk (e.g., AAA 
rated) with the previously mentioned liquid assets: gold and foreign reserves.  
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High quality government bonds typically remain liquid during times of crisis. Turbulent 
markets may, in fact, invoke a flight to safety increasing their demand. The value of such 
bonds is backed by the government´s taxing power and ultimately by the productivity of the 
economy. An excessive issuance of government bonds will reduce their value. Government 
deficit spending reduces the quality of money by implying the danger of higher future taxes or 
the danger of debt monetization.  
 
Government bonds can become illiquid if the creditworthiness of the government becomes 
questionable, especially during extreme crises. During the recent economic crisis a 
recapitalization of the Icelandic central bank with Icelandic government bonds could not have 
increased the quality of the króna sufficiently to save the banking system. The taxing 
effectiveness of the Icelandic government was insufficient to provide liquid assets to back the 
currency. 
 
The last ratio we discuss is the equity ratio. The equity ratio indicates the central bank´s 
leverage. A higher ratio implies a more conservative situation (i.e., less leverage) and an 
increased quality of money. 
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Potential losses on the asset side of the balance sheet can be cushioned by available equity 
and thus prevent a government initiated recapitalization which may potentially increase the 
quantity of money. Additionally, recapitalization can lead to an increase in debt with further 
negative consequences for the quality of money.31  
 
5 Additional considerations 
As important a consideration of the ratio in question is the task of identifying an acceptable 
range of values. At the one extreme, various ethical and legal considerations warrant a return 
to full-reserve banking.32 By keeping full gold reserves against the monetary base, liquidity 
ratio I would take an ideal value of 1. Indeed, no central bank would be necessary to sustain a 
full-reserve banking system.  
 
It is not possible to establish some gold rules for the ratios we develop. We can only make the 
qualitative assertion that the higher the liquidity ratio, equity ratio, defense potential ratio, etc. 
the better for the quality of a currency. Due to the subjectivity of the concept of the quality of 
money there can be, for instance, no objective threshold at which there necessarily would be a 
hyperinflation or devaluation. The ratios represent objective determinants for the quality of 
money. However, they influence also the subjective assessment of the currency. No 
deterministic relationships may be established, especially in a fiat currency system where the 
value of the currency is wholly based on trust. 
 
There are some further caveats and comments. First, other ratios could be considered. Ratios 
involving repurchase agreements or discount activities could be calculated with the 
appropriate adjustments for each individual central bank. The quality of the collateral for the 
repurchase agreements and discount activities are also important for the quality of money, as 
are the amount of direct credits to financial institutions, the quality of such guarantees and the 
potential for haircuts.  
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 Bagus/Howden (2014a; b) assess the methods and costs of a central bank recapitalization. 
32
 See Huerta de Soto (2006); Bagus/Howden (2009c; 2013); Bagus et al. (2013). 
 For example, the longer the term of the securities used as collateral or guarantees, the more 
illiquid they tend to be. Loans granted by the central bank to the banking system are typically 
illiquid assets that cannot be used to defend the currency. Moreover, they contain greater 
credit risk than government bonds. If banks are allowed to use securities of dubious quality 
instead of government debt as loan collateral the quality of money decreases. The calculation 
of a collateral ratio can complement the analysis, but is more difficult to objectively define 
and consistently apply. 
 
It may be necessary to calculate an adjusted equity ratio as the central bank balance sheet may 
contain hidden reserves or burdens. This can be done via a revaluation reserve without 
influencing the central bank income statement. For example, the gold reserves held by the 
Federal Reserve consisting of 8,134 tons are valued at the historical price of $42.44 per troy 
ounce. Its current market value is approximately 30 times higher, implying substantial hidden 
reserves. Conversely, it is possible that impending write-downs of assets have not yet taken 
place.33 This possibility presents the balance sheet in an artificially advantageous way.34 
 
Finally, asset transparency should be considered in any analysis. First, the exact quality of the 
accepted guarantees and collateral is important. Second, the naming of the debtors increases 
transparency. The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), introduced at the 
beginning of the financial crisis and concluded in March 2010, hid the identity of the users of 
such programs as well as the quality of the collateral. This has led to complaints of non-
transparency.35  
 
No supervisory institution akin to private rating agencies exists for central banks. Central 
bank balance sheets are also very heterogeneous lacking a standard set of reporting 
guidelines. Transparency can be improved by providing an appendix and financial reporting 
similar to the disclosures which are now standard practice among their corporate counterparts. 
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 As was the case during Iceland´s crisis in 2008-09, when loans held as assets by the Central Bank of Iceland 
were recorded at their historical cost instead of their (lower) market value (Bagus/Howden 2015).  
34
 An analysis of a central bank’s balance sheet should aim to eliminate the manipulations implied in monetary 
policy reporting as far as possible and make balance sheets of different central banks comparable by using 
current market values of assets.  
35
 See Pittman et al. (2008) and Pittman (2008). Bagus/Howden (2009a) analyze the responses from the ECB 
during the recent financial crisis, especially focusing on the uncertainties stemming from non-transparent assets. 
Dincer/Eichengreen (2009) argue that central bank transparency has increased substantially during the past 
decade, becoming the “greatest change in the conduct of monetary policy.” 
  
6 Conclusion 
While accounting and balance sheet analysis are well developed for the business community, 
few bank specific balance sheet analyses exist. More egregiously, a framework for analyzing 
central bank balance sheets is missing altogether. This is especially problematic since new 
monetary policies used by central bankers are continually developed and their results are as 
yet difficult to ascertain. Balance sheet analysis is especially apt for those policies as they are 
not reflected so much in interest rates as they are in changes to the size and composition of 
asset holdings.  
 
An analysis of a central bank's balance sheet conveys important macroeconomic implications. 
In the case of a central bank, stakeholders are all those counterparties holding its obligations. 
These stakeholders are the holders of cash who use this money for payments, or whose bank 
deposits are covered by reserves held at the central bank. For money users it is important to 
know which real assets back and constrain the money supply. Surprisingly, there is little 
supervision for reporting bank asset and liability balances. This dualism in accounting 
standards – highly developed standards for the private business community versus lax or 
absent ones for central banks – is problematic. 
 
We have developed a foundation for the previously missing method of central bank balance 
sheet analysis. Starting with the quality theory of money, we have derived seven different 
balance sheet ratios, differentiating between defense, liquidity, and equity ratios as proxies for 
the quality of the assets backing a currency. Important caveats include the lack of 
transparency concerning central bank reporting, and also the effects of hidden reserves on or 
off the balance sheets of a central bank.  
 
Detailed balance sheet analysis is justified as a central bank's assets are closely connected 
with the value of its currency. The assets of the central bank back its obligations, comprised 
mostly of the monetary base. An analysis of a central bank´s balance sheet can indicate future 
directions in monetary policy, money’s ensuing quality, and how these factors are able to 
influence the expectations of households and firms. This analysis can serve, therefore, as an 
early warning for future financial crises and inflationary trends.  
 
 Since the beginning of the liquidity crisis of 2008 central banks around the world have not 
only increased the size of their balance sheets but also significantly altered their compositions. 
Important challenges have resulted. First, it is important to analyze the consequences of the 
crisis for the individual central banks and compare them accordingly. Second, relevant 
insights may be deduced by comparing balance sheets of central banks during the financial 
crisis to historical parallels like the Japanese bubble of the late 1980s or America´s Great 
Depression. Finally, our own approach to analyze central bank balance sheets must be 
continually improved by focusing on present events and developments to monetary policy. 
We have created the necessary framework to analyzing future changes in monetary policy. 
We leave empirical applications – both historical and current – to future research. 
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